Abstract-Security-as-a-service (SaaS) is an outsourcing model for security management in cloud computing. Vulnerability scanners based on cloud computing is becoming one of the killer applications in SaaS due to the pay-per-use manner and powerful scanning capability. When performing vulnerability scanning through network, the scanner needs to establish a large number of TCP connections with the target host. To deal with the problem of IPv4 address shortening and to protect the hosts within the organization, the target hosts are almost always deployed behind a NAPT(Network Address and Port Translation) device, TCP packets sent by the scanner outside the network isolated by the NAPT device will be blocked, thus unable to complete the vulnerability scanning task when the scanners are deployed in the cloud. While there exists NAPT traversal methods, they support TCP poorly and therefore is not ready for the vulnerability scanning scenario where a large number of TCP connections needs to be established. In this paper we proposed a NAPT proxy named CloudProxy for adopting vulnerability scanners in cloud computing by combining the TURN extension protocol and the Socks5 protocol. We integrated function of Socks5 into the TURN client, so that the destination port of all scanning packets will be aggregated before passing through the TURN server, lessen the burden of the TURN server. The experimental results show that CloudProxy can relay packets for the vulnerability scanner based on cloud computing in a transparent way and its scalability is sufficient for practical use.
I. INTRODUCTION

A. Security Issue
According to the 2011 Global Security Stats and Trends report [1] , during the past two years, individuals became easily identifiable to attackers. Malicious tools became more sophisticated. New attack vectors like mobile, social networking and web-based are introduced as we innovate while old vectors like normal applications never die. And in 2011, one of the most notable trends was that 89% of the attacks were focused on obtaining personally identifiable information and other customer data, exploiting system vulnerability of individuals and organizations. At the same time, the Computer Emergency Response Team (CERT) also says in the report of Network Monitoring for Web-Based Threats [2] , that web-based vulnerabilities have made the web into a wonderfully powerful yet very dangerous place. The vulnerabilities will no doubt only increase as the web continues to grow.
At the U.S. National Vulnerability Database (NVD), there are a total of 50049 vulnerabilities when this paper is written, 14364 of which are documented in the last three years. And since March 2012, there are about 1332 new vulnerability records, which involves authentication issues, code injection, credentials management, design error, OS command injection, SQL injection and a variety of other different categories of vulnerability.
On the other hand, the global outbreak of a variety of security events has proved that network security is under serious threat. For example, in 2010 and 2011, the NASA agency had 5,408 computer security incidents and other security vulnerabilities that resulted in the installation of malicious software or unauthorized access. Some of these intrusions have affected thousands of NASA computers, caused significant disruption to mission operations, and resulted in the theft of sensitive data, with an estimated cost for NASA of more than $7 million [3] . It is obvious that even the most recognized agencies and companies are being threatened by serious network security problems all the time. Thus, security issues have become increasingly important. However, security assessment is very costly due to the fact that new vulnerabilities are found from time to time and the skills for managing network vulnerability, such as developing vulnerability scanning plug-ins, comparing scanning results, assessing the risk of security and providing appropriate security enhancement recommendations, are complicated. How to secure networks in a costly manner is a big challenge. Recently, cloud computing, the new IT paradigm, is considered to be a promising direction for solving the challenge.
B. SaaS and Cloud Based Vulnerability Scanning
Security as a service (SaaS) is an outsourcing model for security management. It involves application such as antivirus software and intrusion detection systems provided by an external organization. SaaS is regularly proposed as the most promising approach for realizing security functions. SaaS allows service clients and the provider not to pay attention to security components but devote more time to their core business logic [4] .
Vulnerability scanning is a kind of SaaS. Using it, the service provider is able to scan the customer's network for vulnerabilities and poor configurations without exploiting them. Each and every enterprise, whether large, medium or small, is concerned about data leakage, data theft and overall IT security problems. The best way to avoid security attacks is to use vulnerability scanning to check your network and systems, keeping dangers outside your door.
However, because of the large numbers of IP nodes and high security requirements of the Internet, it is usually infeasible to meet the time and efficiency requirements using only one single vulnerability scanner to scan a large network. The rise of cloud computing is pushing vulnerability scanning into a new horizon cloud-based vulnerability scanning. Cloud-based vulnerability scanning is the use of scanning resources (scanning engines, plug-ins and management modules) that are delivered as a service over a network (typically the Internet) by deploying a large number of network-based vulnerability scanners on the cloud platform. And it is the cloud management platform that dispatches and schedules all of the scanning resources. There are compelling advantages of using cloud based vulnerability scanning services. Since cloud computing can provide service in an automatic and pay-per-use manner, cloud-based vulnerability scanning will support customized security services with much less costs. It is also a more professional way to assess the security of customers' networks than the conventional local-network-based one since it is equipped with high quality scanning plug-ins that are developed by security exports working for the cloud provider. It will provide more in-depth scanning reports and effective recommendations since the cloud platform has enormous computing resources for supporting the large scale scanning results analysis. The enormous computing resources are also very helpful for finding new kind of vulnerabilities, which means cloud-based vulnerability scanning will updates more timely so as to mitigate new threats in time.
Thus, cloud-based vulnerability scanning has become one of the killer applications in SaaS.
II. MOTIVATING EXAMPLE
A. Problem
Limitations imposed by NAPT. On February 3rd of 2011, the Internet Assigned Numbers Authority (IANA) allocated the remaining IPv4 address space in accordance with the Global Policy for the Allocation of the Remaining IPv4 Address Space. With this action, the pool of available IPv4 addresses is now fully depleted [5] . Using IPv6 instead of IPv4 is a way to acquire more addresses. However, it will take a long time until IPv6 prevails. To provide more IPv4 addresses, NAPT [6] had been used widely. Another reason for using NAPT and relating equipments is to hide the IP addresses of the internal hosts, so as to reduce the possibility of being attacked directly by the potential attackers from outside the network. But NAPT, unlike IDS or firewall, is not equipment that is dedicated to provide security protection. A private network with NAPT is still facing variety of security threats. For example, malwares, such as computer viruses, worms, trojan horses and rootkits, can still spread into private networks through web browsing, emails or removable storage devices. Once the vulnerabilities of the hosts in the private network are exploited by the threats, it would lead to major security loss to the organization. Therefore, it is significantly important to scan a private network for vulnerabilities.
There are two variations to traditional NAT, namely Basic NAT and NAPT (Network Address Port Translation). [6] Basic NAT is the simplest type of NAT provides a one-to-one translation of IP addresses. NAPT extends the notion of translation one step further by also translating the transport identifier (e.g., TCP and UDP port numbers). This allows the transport identifiers of a number of private hosts to be multiplexed into the transport identifiers of a single external address. NAPT allows a set of hosts to share a single external address.
Using NAPT, several private IP addresses can multiplex one public IP address, thus alleviates the shortage of available IPv4 addresses. On the down-side, however, when NAPT is used, a host in the public network cannot access the internal hosts isolated by the NAPT equipment, because the former is assigned with a private IP address which is not routable in the public network.
If the scanning target is behind NAPT equipment, there is no way that the TCP packets sent by the scanner will reach the target, thus it is impossible to complete the scanning task. Apart from the aforementioned reason, this is due to the strict restrictions imposed by some strict NAPTs, such as port restricted or symmetric NAPT, on access from the external network. For an external host, knowing the mapped IP address(i.e. the public IP address of the NAPT equipment) and mapped port of the internal host on the NAPT equipment is not sufficient for it to connect the internal host. The internal host must access the external host once before the NAPT equipment allows the external host to connect the internal host using the mapped IP address and port.
Characteristics of Vulnerability Scanning. Figure.1 shows the deployment of cloud-based vulnerability scanning. The scanners are installed on virtual machines. All the virtual machines are in the cloud and dynamically scheduled by the scanning management platform. And there may be a NAT equipment deployed on the entrance of the target network, blocking the scanning packets from reaching the target hosts.
The cloud-based vulnerability scanning involves two major phases: preparation and scanning. The most significant activities are port scanning and service detection in the preparation phase, and the plug-in detection in the scanning phase. The purpose of port scanning and service detection is to check the status of certain ports(e.g. the well-known ports) and identify the services provided through them. The scanner will record the set of ports in open state and the identified services on the hosts under scanning. Then, according to the identified services, the scanner will select appropriate plug-ins, which are encapsulated scripts dedicated for scanning particular kinds of services, to detect the potential vulnerabilities of the target in the scanning phase. Figure. 2 illustrates how a vulnerability scanner works.
In the example shown in Figure. 2, the scanner uses its ports portS 1 − portS n to establish TCP connections with the targets ports portT 1 − portT n , respectively, to detect the port status(e.g. open, closed or filtered) and the services that run on portT 1 − portT n . Then, it finds out that the MySQL service is running on port 3306 of the target host. So the scanner runs the MySQL plugin to detect the existence of MySQL vulnerabilities on the target host. The detection process is still carried out by sending and receiving TCP packets. Besides MySQL, typical network services, such as FTP, HTTP and Telnet, are all TCP-oriented, therefore vulnerability scanning for these services also requires establishing a large number of TCP connections.
In addition, it can be seen from Figure. 2 that the TCP connections established between the scanner and the target share some common features: the destination IP is the IP address of the target host and the destination port may be any port (portT 1 − portT n ) of the target that may provide a vulnerable service. Thus if the target host is behind NAPT, to complete one scanning task, the scanner needs to know the real IP address and all target ports that will be involved. Apparently, it is impossible for the scanner to finish this task without additional mechanism. However, if it uses some NAPT port prediction algorithms such as Port Analysis and Prediction Algorithm (PCAP) [7] , it requires the scanner to predict the entire set of target ports (portT 1 − portT n ) before starting the scanning task, and then use the PCAP algorithm several times which would take up a lot of CPU resources and cause serious delay. It also results in high adoption costs since the scanner needs to be modified to support the port prediction algorithms. In addition, since the source port of the TCP packets sent by the scanner are constantly changing (portS 1 −portS n ), it is infeasible for the scanner to make every packet (with different source port) sent by itself acquire access permission to the NAPT isolated network when the NAPT is a symmetric one.
In summary, with the limitation imposed by NAPT and the characteristics of vulnerability scanning, vulnerability scanning is difficult to be directly applied to the cloud computing environment.
B. Purpose
The purpose of this paper is to design a cloud-based vulnerability scanning proxy CloudProxy, to solve the problem of scanners unable to scan target hosts behind NAPT. With the help of CloudProxy, the following goals can be achieved:
(1) The vulnerability scanner can be directly applied to the cloud computing environment without any modification.
(2) The vulnerability scanner can complete scanning the target hosts behind NAPT.
(3) Compared to NAPT port prediction algorithms and other methods, our method requires less CPU resources, thus is more suitable for vulnerability scanning.
(4) The CloudProxy will enable vulnerability scanning to be used more widely, for instance, scanning the internal network of large enterprises from the outside.
III. OVERVIEW TURN(Traversal Using Relay NAT) extension supports TCP NAT traversal. It works in the C/S mode by setting the TURN client inside the NAPT network and the TURN server outside. For traversing NAPT, the TURN client first sends a TURN request to the TURN server, using its IP address IP-c and port port-x. After the TURN server has verified the identity of the TURN client, it will allocate a relay port, for example port-y, to the TURN client. Then, the TURN client needs to provide the TURN server with a list of IP addresses of the external peers that will be granted the permission to access the internal NAPT network. In this way, all the privileged external peers could communicate with port-x of the TURN client through the relay port port-y of the TURN server. Thus, TURN established a channel for NAPT traversal between external and internal peers.
According to the principle of TURN, TURN only checks the access permission of peers with their IP addresses, which will help the scanner avoid the need to make every packet (with different source port) sent by itself acquire access permission to the NAPT network. However, the relay port port-y on the TURN server corresponds to the source port port-x of the TURN client that sent the TURN request. If we apply TURN directly to cloud-based vulnerability scanning and suppose that we scan portT 1 − portT n of a host inside the NAPT, then the TURN client wound need to send n TURN requests to the TURN server, using its portC 1 − portC n respectively, to establish n channels for NAPT traversal. This won't work for two reasons. The first one is that before executing the scanning task, the scanner may not be able to determine the set of target destination ports. Another is that the destination ports of a scan task may range from 1 to 65535, therefore the TURN client would need to establish 65535 TCP channels with the TURN server, which, on one hand, will cause too much overhead in channel establishment, on the other hand, is limited by the number of ports available on the TURN server.
To solve these two problems, we present a method to enable the CloudProxy to aggregate destination ports of all scanning packets into one. The CloudProxy would establish only one NAPT traversal channel corresponding to the internal port-x on the TURN client and relay port-y on the TURN server. And all of the consecutive scan packets will be sent to port-y. After port-x receives the packets, the TURN client will then carry out port disaggregation, forwarding the packets to the scanning target hosts.
We adopt Socks5 protocol [8] in CloudProxy to complete the aggregation of destination ports. The Socks5 protocol sets a shim socks-layer between the transport and application layer and takes the C/S mode. The way to apply Socks5 to vulnerability scanning port aggregation is: (1) Install Socks5 client where the scanner is; (2) Socks5 client captures all packets sent by the scanner from NIC and re-package them by taking the application data of the original packet and put them into the application layer of the new packet. The destination IP address and port of the new packet should be set as the IP address and port of the Socks5 server. The destination IP address and port of the original packet will be contained in the shim socks-layer of the new packet.
In this way, we combine Socks5 and TURN into the CloudProxy which solves the above problem. The main idea is: (1) following TURN, the CloudProxy establishes a TCP traversal channel between port-x of the TURN client and relay port-y of the TURN server; (2) the Socks5 client encapsulates the original packets sent by the scanner and forwards them to port-y; (3) when the encapsulated packets are received by the TURN client, the client will take the data out of the shim socks-layer and the application layer, process the data and forward it to the Socks5 server; (4) the Socks5 server decapsulates the packets and forwards them to the target host, thus completing the proxy work of the vulnerability scanning.
IV. BACKGROUND AND RELATED WORK
The STUN(Session traversal Utilities for NAT) protocol is defined in RFC5389 [9] . It allows applications operating through a NAPT to discover the presence of NAPT and to obtain the mapped IP address (public, NAPT address) and port number that the NAPT has allocated for the application's UDP connections to remote hosts. STUN does not work with symmetric NAPT which is often found in the networks of large companies. It doesn't support TCP either.
TURN, defined in RFC5766 [10] , is a way to traverse symmetric NAPTs. TURN is a client-server protocol. It allows a host behind a NAPT to request the TURN server outside the NAPT to act as a relay server. Thus, TURN is an effective solution for traversing symmetric NAPTs. The extended protocol of TURN, defined in RFC6062 [11] , supports TCP NAPT traversal. However, a TURN server has to process all packets which are sent via a symmetric NAPT.
There are existing methods of NAPT traversal based on the above two protocols [12] [13] [14] . Various other specific methods, such as UDP multi-hole punching [15] and Port Prediction [7] have already been developed. However, these methods are unable to meet the requirements of vulnerability scanning, which requires a large number of TCP connections to traverse NAPT during one single scanning task, because the target inside NAPT needs to send a large number of TURN requests to the TURN server, and the TURN server needs to allocate corresponding relay ports for the target.
At first glance, it seems that VPN (Virtual Private Network) is also an alternative method to aid the vulnerability scanner in accessing the NAPT network. However, VPN is mainly used to provide secure remote access to internal resources. Commonly used VPN technologies, such as PPTP and IPSec VPN, work on the data link layer or network layer, thus lack port information. Therefore, it is difficult for them to realize NAPT traversal. TLS/SSL VPN is above the transport layer and encrypts the segments of network connections at the application layer. It is mainly used to access servers from outside and requires the target server to allocate dedicated ports for TLS/SSL connection. This is not the case for most of the target requiring vulnerability scanning. Therefore VPN is not suitable for NAPT traversal in vulnerability scanning. 
A. Server and Client Design of CloudProxy
The overall structure of CloudProxy is shown in Figure. 3. CloudProxy consists of two modules: server and client. The server module is composed of a Socks5 server and a TURN client. These two parts are both deployed in the private target network(i.e. the NAPT network). The Socks5 server is responsible for dispatching the aggregated packets to their respective targets. The TURN client is responsible for NAPT traversal. To achieve the goal of this paper, the CloudProxy modifies the TURN client in such a way: (1) adding a Socks5 packet process module in the TURN client; (2) re-packaging TURN packets and forwarding them to the Socks5 server. The process module needs to distinguish different packets based on the IP addresses and ports of the peers that sent them and record their indications (i.e. the identity of the peer denoted by the source and destination IP addresses and ports), so as to ensure that the TURN client could forward the packets that returned from the Socks5 server back to the corresponding peers correctly. In addition, because TCP is a stream-oriented protocol, CloudProxy adds a pre-process module in the TURN client, to buffer the TCP data streams containing the TURN packets, then divide and insert them into the TURN packet list according to the TURN protocol format.
The client module contains two parts: Socks5 client and TURN server. The Socks5 client is bundled with the scanner, which is deployed in the public network or another NAPT network. The TURN server is deployed in the public network. The Socks5 client is responsible for aggregating the destination ports of the scanning packets. The TURN server is responsible for NAPT traversal, in cooperation with the TURN client.
B. CloudProxy Message Flow
Preparations Figure.4 shows the preparation phase of CloudProxy, which is establishing the channel for TCP NAPT traversal. The detailed steps are described as follows:
1-1. The TURN client randomly chooses a port-x, and uses port-x to send a relay port allocation request to the TURN server. ip-t port-t 2-1 ScanPack(data,ip-t,port-t) 2-2 SocksPack(socks_data,port-y) 2-3 TurnPack(id,socks_data,port-x) 2-4 SocksPack(socks_data,1080) 2-5 ScanPack(data,ip-t,port-t) 2-6 ScanResponse(data',ip-t,port-t) 2-7 SocksPack(socks_data') 2-8 TurnPack(id,socks_data') 2-9 SocksPack(socks_data') 2-10 ScanPack(data') 1-3. The TURN server sends the response to the TURN client, containing the allocated port-y in the packet. The relay port-y is recorded as the port of the Socks5 server and filled in the configure file of the Socks5 client.
1-4. The TURN client sends the IP addresses list of the peers that are permitted to communicate with port-y of the TURN Server.
1-5. The TURN server sets the above permission list for the relay port-y.
1-6. The TURN server returns a success response for establishing the channel.
Vulnerability scanning
In Figure. 5, we suppose that the scanner will scan portt of the target host with IP address ip-t inside the NAPT network. The scanning process from the scanner to the target is described as follows: 2-1. The scanner sends scanning packets to the target (ip-t: port-t).
2-2. The Socks5 client intercepts the scanning packets. It encapsulates the targets IP address and port in the socks data field of the Socks5 packet, then sends the packet to the corresponding relay port-y of the TURN server.
2-3. The TURN server receives the Socks5 packet, tagging it with an ID idx based on its source IP address and port. Then, the TURN server forwards the packet to the TURN client through source port port-idx.
2-4. The pre-reception thread of the TURN client first stores the TCP data stream retrieved from the socket buffer. And the pre-process thread of the TURN client, at the same time, splits the data stream into TURN packets based on the TURN protocol format and inserts them into a TURN packet list. The TURN packets in the list will be processed by the main thread of the TURN client synchronously in accordance with the TURN protocol. Moreover, the main thread also performs socks related tasks: (1) check the ID of the Socks5 packets; (2) repackage the one with ID idx without changing the socks data part; (3) replace the target IP address and port with the Socks5 servers IP address and port. At the same time, the main thread needs to check whether it is the first time that the TURN client receives packets with ID idx. The TURN client will send Socks5 requests to the Socks5 server if it is, do nothing otherwise.
2-5. The Socks5 server receives the Socks5 packet. Then it unpacks the target IP address and port from the socks data field, and forwards the data in the application layer to the target host.
The above are the steps of the scanner sending scanning packets to a target. After these steps, if the target has its port-t opened, it will return a scanning response back to the scanner. The detailed steps are as follows:
2-6. The target host generates the response data and sends it to the Socks5 server.
2-7. The Socks5 server encapsulates the data into the socks data field and forwards it to the TURN client.
2-8. The TURN client receives the Socks5 packet. Besides processing the TURN packet in accordance with the TURN protocol, it has the following extended function: check the destination IP address of the Socks5 packet. If it matches a certain recorded ID idx, then the TURN client will forward the packet to the corresponding port-idx of the TURN server.
2-9. The TURN server forwards the Socks5 packet to the corresponding port of port-idx on the Socks5 client.
2-10. The Socks5 client receives the Socks5 packet. It unpacks and submits the data in socks data to the upper application(i.e. the scanner).
At this point, the entire message flow for one port scanning from the scanner to the target using CloudProxy completes. When multiple scanners at different nodes scan multiple targets in one NAPT network at the same time, each scanner will use its own Socks5 client and share the same TURN server. If the targets are in large quantities, CloudProxy can use more than one TURN client to establish multiple NAPT traversal channels, which will work in parallel to improve the proxy efficiency. Message flows among each 6-tuple group ¡scanner, Socks5 client, TURN server, TURN client, Socks5 server, target¿, are the same as the ones described in Figure.4 and Figure. 5.
VI. EVALUATION
In this section, we will evaluate the performance of the proposed CloudProxy and analyze the results.
A. Experiment Setup
The hosts and network environment which were used to evaluate CloudProxy are listed and shown in Table I and Figure.6 .
As is shown in Figure. 6, we set up a symmetric NAPT network as the target network using Window Virtual PC. The target and the CloudProxy server are both in the target network. The CloudProxy client is in the public network and it has a public IP address which can be routed in the Internet. Then, we set up another core NAPT network as the scanner network using VMware. The vulnerability scanner, pre-installed with the CloudProxy client component, is deployed in it.
B. Experiments and Result Analysis
Function
First, we tested the connectivity of the scanning without CloudProxy. The result is the same as we expected: all packets sent by the scanner were dropped by the NAPT equipment of Private-1, and the scanner reported that the targets were unreachable.
Then, we used our CloudProxy to assist the scanning. CloudProxy worked as expected. The scanner finished the scanning task successfully and reported the specific vulnerability of the targets.
It is worth noticing that it takes 20 seconds to finish the scanning task. If we put the target in the public network, it will take 12 seconds on average for the scanner to finish the same scanning task without using any proxy. The delay caused by CloudProxy is unavoidable, but can be reduced with a more smart scanning strategy, for instance, sending less scanning packets to achieve the same goal with prior knowledge on the target.
Apart from the differences on whether the network can be scanned from outside, the functions of networks with and without CloudProxy are the same. In other words, CloudProxy adds one function (scannable from outside) to the private network, but doesn't hurt the existing functions of the network.
Scalability
Scalability of CloudProxy means that with the increase of the number of peers, CloudProxy can easily support the increment, without becoming the performance bottleneck. To evaluate this metric independently with any existing scanners, we used the network tool Netcat [16] to simulate the scene of vulnerability scanning. The detailed methods are as follows.
We set up two server machines. The first one is used to run Netcat in sending mode, which sends packets to a specified range of ports of the second one. The second machine is used to run Netcat in listening mode, which listens to the specified range of ports and returns responses after receiving TCP connection requests. In this way, we setup a scenario using Netcat to simulate a vulnerability scanning task, in which the first server scans the specified ports of the second one. In real environments, different targets have different IP addresses. Thus the scanner needs to establish TCP connection with different IP addresses. However, when we design the scalability experiment for CloudProxy, we only considered the traffic flowing through CloudProxy. In other words, we focus on the amount of TCP connections made though CloudProxy which is the main factor affecting the scalability of CloudProxy. Therefore, the difference between the real environment and the simulation environment introduced by Netcat won't cause significant impact on the scalability experiment of CloudProxy.
At the same time, we used network tool hping [17] to measure the RTT (Round Trip Time) between two hosts in the Internet, one is the author's host, the other is randomly selected in the network of a company which is one of the consumers of the cloud based vulnerability scanner developed by us. We let the author's host send TCP connection packets to port 6000 -7000 of the real target host and calculated the average RTT. The result is that the average RTT is 81.90 milliseconds. Then we added the RTT in the former experiment performed with Netcat. We set the parameters of Netcat, making it to send TCP connection packets with an interval that equals to the average RTT. In this way, we simulated the delays in the real network. Then, we controlled the number of packets sent by Netcat in order to simulate different scanning scales. For each scanning scale, we carried out the experiment 100 times, and recorded the execution time in both cases of using CloudProxy and not using it. Finally, we calculated and recorded the average time, as shown in Table II. In the above experiments, Netcat sent packets one by one. Thus, CloudProxy only processed one TCP connection of one peer. However, in a real scanning, there may be multiple scanning tasks executing at the same time. Namely, CloudProxy needs to use multithreading to handle multiple TCP connections. In order to simulate multiple scanning tasks executing in parallel, we used multi-threading to launch multiple Netcats to send packets at the same time. We controlled the number of Netcat threads and recorded the execution time under different number of threads. The average time values of the executions are calculated and shown in Table III. It is important to mention that the bandwidth of CloudProxys NIC is 100Mb/s, in full-duplex mode. The general packet sending and receiving frequencies of scanning tasks are no more than 0.033Mb/s and 0.25Mb/s respectively. Increasing the frequency would cause the firewall of the target network to identify the scanning task as a flooding attack and filter all of the scanning packets. These two frequencies in our simulation experiment in Table III are 0.022Mb/s and 0.017Mb/s. The CloudProxy in the experiment can support at most 1000 peers at the same time. When 1000 peers use the CloudProxy in parallel, the bandwidth will be 33Mb/s upstream and 25Mb/s downstream, which are less than the upper limit of the bandwidth of NIC. Therefore the possibility that bandwidth may become the bottleneck can be excluded from our experiment.
Based on the experiment data recorded in Table II and  Table III , we represent two comparison line charts, as shown in Figure.7 and Figure. 8. It can be seen from Figure. 7 that with the growth of the number of TCP connections (i.e. the scanning scale), the execution time with or without CloudProxy both grows linearly. The average execution time with CloudProxy is 1.6 times more than the case without it (Average of Diff, which is the ratio of the slopes of lines in Figure.7 ). This ratio does not grow with the growth of the scanning scale, which means CloudProxy scales well. It can be seen from Figure. 8 that when using multi-threading to simulate multi-peers, with the growing number of peers, for the same TCP connection scale, the average execution time increases linearly. Thus, we can conclude that with the growth of the scanning scale, it would be hard for CloudProxy to become the performance bottleneck in practice since it has a relatively high scalability. CloudProxy combines the TURN extension protocol and the Socks5 protocol. The CloudProxy integrates Socks5 function into the TURN client, so that the destination port of all scanning packets will be aggregated into one before passing through the TURN server, lessening the burden for the TURN server.
We have set up a testing environment in which we deployed CloudProxy between two private NAPT networks and performed related tests. The results show that CloudProxy is functional and scalable . As the scale of scanning becomes larger, execution time for CloudProxy increases linearly. Since we have taken the real network delay into consideration, the testing results imply that CloudProxy would be practical in real application.
For future works, we will improve the adaptability of CloudProxy, so that it can tune the relaying speed according to the sensed situation of the target network. We also plan to strengthen the coordination between CloudProxy and the scanner, so that the scanner can adjust its sending speed in accordance with the relaying speed of CloudProxy. In this way, we would be able to minimize the involvement of the administrator and provide a more elastic scanning service in the cloud.
